Featured Work
Jan 1, 2025
Andrey Malenko, Nadya Malenko | Working Paper No. 00158-00
Voting Choice
Traditionally, fund managers cast votes on behalf of fund investors. Recently, there is a shift towards "pass-through voting," with fund managers offering their investors a choice: delegate their votes to...
Jun 27, 2024
Robin Döttling, Doron Levit, Nadya Malenko, Magdalena Rola-Janicka | Working Paper No. 00153-00
Voting on Public Goods: Citizens vs Shareholders
We study the interplay between a "one person-one vote" political system and a "one share-one vote" corporate governance regime. If shareholders push firms for more pro-social policies, political backlash may...
Jan 5, 2021
Doron Levit, Nadya Malenko, Ernst Maug | Working Paper No. 00154-00
The Voting Premium
This paper develops a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium, in a setting without takeovers and controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder tries...
Oct 3, 2019
Doron Levit, Nadya Malenko, Ernst G. Maug | Working Paper No. 00157-00
Trading and Shareholder Democracy
We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal...
Aug 25, 2018
Ali Kakhbod, Uliana Loginova, Andrey Malenko, Nadya Malenko | Working Paper No. 00155-00
Advising the Management: A Theory of Shareholder Engagement
We study the effectiveness of shareholder engagement, that is, shareholders communicating their views to management. When shareholders and management have different beliefs, each shareholder engages more effectively when other shareholders...
Apr 3, 2016
Andrey Malenko, Nadya Malenko | Working Paper No. 00156-00
Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters
We analyze how proxy advisors, which sell voting recommendations to shareholders, affect corporate decision-making. If the quality of the advisor's information is low, there is overreliance on its recommendations and...
Jan 1, 2011
Doron Levit, Nadya Malenko | Working Paper No. 00163-00
Nonbinding voting for shareholder proposals
Shareholder proposals are a common form of shareholder activism. Voting for shareholder proposals, however, is nonbinding since management has the authority to reject the proposal even if it received majority...
