We study dynamic monopoly pricing with multiple buyers whose privately known valuations are correlated, so one buyer’s purchase reveals information about others. Without seller commitment, these information spillovers alter future pricing incentives and feed back into current demand. They generate...

We model credit competition between a bigtech platform and a bank lending to a merchant under limited commitment and asymmetric information about the merchant’s incentives to default. The platform leverages its control over a marketplace to enforce partial loan repayments,...

I analyze how a security’s cash-flow rights and economic conditions shape its secondary-market liquidity. I develop a competitive bid–ask model with asymmetric information that has a unique equilibrium for a broad class of fundamental distributions and payoff functions, including nonlinear...

Less informative strategic advice can produce more informative prices. We study a finfluencer who reports on an asset’s value, trades on his private information, and receives promotional pay linked to the post-report price. With the quality of private information fixed,...

An organization must often make a collective decision on behalf of two units that hold different private information, prefer different outcomes, and cannot use monetary transfers. We ask which unit’s information should...

A firm that wants innovation must attract workers whose suitability for exploration it cannot observe. Any contract that attracts explorers is also open to exploiters. In a two-period model with hidden actions,...