We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation
concerns, such as a bank or an auditor. The monitor oversees a manager, who chooses
how much to manipulate given the monitor's reputation. Reputational incentives...

We characterize necessary conditions for socially responsible investors to impact firm behavior in a setting in which firm production generates social costs and is subject to financing constraints. Impact requires a broad mandate, in that socially responsible investors need to...

We study time-consistent debt policies in a trade-off model of debt in which the firm can freely issue new debt and repurchase existing debt. A debt policy is time-consistent if in any state equityholders prefer to follow it rather than...

Disagreement about macroeconomic fundamentals accounts for only part of the disagreement about future interest rates, creating a ‘‘disagreement correlation’’ puzzle. This puzzle arises because standard equilibrium models with belief differences predict a strong link between asset return disagreement and fundamental...

We develop a new theory of information production during credit booms. Entrepreneurs need credit to undertake investment projects, some of which enable them to divert resources. Lenders can protect themselves from such diversion in two ways: collateralization and costly screening,...

How effectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout the economy? We study this question in a dynamic setting where sellers have private information that is correlated with an unobservable aggregate state. In any equilibrium, each seller's...