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Uploaded: Feb 19, 2019

Lin William Cong (å¢ęž—)

Information Cascades and Threshold Implementation

Economic activities such as crowdfunding often involve sequential interactions, observational learning, and project implementation contingent on achieving certain thresholds of support. We incorporate endogenous all-or-nothing thresholds in a classic model of information cascade. We find that early supporters tap the...

Uploaded: Feb 6, 2019

Uday Rajan

FinTech Disruption, Payment Data, and Bank Information

We study the impact of FinTech competition on a monopolist bank that bundles payment processing and lending. In our model, consumers' payment data contain information about their credit quality. This information is valuable to the bank when making loans. Surprisingly,...

Uploaded: Feb 5, 2019

Vincent Maurin

A Theory of Liquidity in Private Equity

We propose a model of Private Equity (PE) investment that can rationalize several empirical findings about fundraising and returns. General partners (GPs) possess superior investment skills and raise capital from Limited Partners (LPs) to finance illiquid projects within funds. The...

Uploaded: Feb 1, 2019

Pierre-Olivier Weill

A Theory of Participation in OTC and Centralized Markets

Should regulators encourage the migration of trade from over-the-counter (OTC) to centralized markets? To address this question, we consider a model of equilibrium and socially optimal market participation of heterogeneous banks in an OTC market, in a centralized market, or...

Uploaded: Feb 1, 2019

Jean-Edouard Colliard

Inventory Management, Dealers' Connections, and Prices in OTC Markets

We propose a new model of interdealer trading. Dealers trade together to reduce their inventory holding costs. Core dealers share these costs efficiently and provide liquidity to peripheral dealers, who have heterogeneous access to core dealers. We derive predictions about...

Uploaded: Feb 1, 2019

Andrey Malenko

Asymmetric Information and Security Design under Knightian Uncertainty

We study a signaling game in which an issuer with private information about the distribution of the project’s cash flows designs a security to sell to an uninformed investor to raise financing for the project. The investor faces Knightian uncertainty...