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Uploaded: Jul 1, 2025

Thomas Geelen, Jakub Hajda

Succession

Managing CEO succession is one of the board’s most important tasks. We develop a dynamic model of CEO succession to analyze executive hiring, firing, and entrenchment. The board learns about the CEO’s and successor’s ability and can decide to replace...

Uploaded: Jun 30, 2025

Anthony Lee Zhang | Working Paper No. 00168-00

The Pricing of Property Tax Revenues

A property tax can be thought of as a capital structure, which divides a stream of rents into components accruing to the homeowner and to the government. Near-term rents mainly accrue to homeowners, and far-term rents mainly accrue to governments....

Uploaded: Jun 30, 2025

Anthony Lee Zhang | Working Paper No. 00167-00

Competition in the Cryptocurrency Exchange Market

Cryptocurrency exchange market structure is fragmented, since cryptocurrencies are fungible, but customers cannot move freely across cryptocurrency exchanges. We build a model where exchanges with captive customers are linked by arbitrageurs, showing that ``star-shaped'' equilibria can exist, in which arbitrageurs...

Uploaded: Jun 30, 2025

Jean-Edouard Colliard | Working Paper No. 00166-00

Artificial Intelligence and the Rents of Finance Workers

This paper studies how artificial intelligence (AI) affects the finance labor market when
humans and AI perform different tasks in investment projects, and workers earn agency
rents that grow with project size. We identify two key effects of AI improvement: A freeriding
effect...

Uploaded: Jun 25, 2025

Campbell Harvey, Fahad Saleh, Ruslan Sverchkov

An Economic Model of the L1-L2 Interaction

We provide an economic model of the interaction between a Layer-1 (L1) blockchain and an associated Layer-2 (L2). Our main finding is that, even when the L1 blockchain features value-creating decentralized applications (dApps), there nevertheless exist realistic conditions such that...

Published: Journal of Finance, 2011

Doron Levit, Nadya Malenko | Working Paper No. 00163-00

Nonbinding voting for shareholder proposals

Shareholder proposals are a common form of shareholder activism. Voting for shareholder proposals, however, is nonbinding since management has the authority to reject the proposal even if it received majority support from shareholders. We analyze whether nonbinding voting is an...