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Uploaded: Jun 5, 2025

Toni Ahnert, Christoph Bertsch, Agnese Leonello, Robert Marquez | Working Paper No. 00159-00

Bank fragility and risk management

Shocks to a bank’s ability to raise liquidity at short notice can trigger depositor panics. Why don’t banks take a more active role in managing these risks? We study contingent risk management (hedging) in a standard global-games model of a...

Uploaded: Jun 5, 2025

Andrey Malenko, Nadya Malenko | Working Paper No. 00158-00

Voting Choice

Traditionally, fund managers cast votes on behalf of fund investors. Recently, there is a shift towards "pass-through voting," with fund managers offering their investors a choice: delegate their votes to the fund or vote themselves. We develop a theory of...

Uploaded: Jun 5, 2025

Doron Levit, Nadya Malenko, Ernst G. Maug | Working Paper No. 00157-00

Trading and Shareholder Democracy

We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move...

Published: Journal of Finance, 2025

Andrey Malenko, Nadya Malenko | Working Paper No. 00156-00

Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters

We analyze how proxy advisors, which sell voting recommendations to shareholders, affect corporate decision-making. If the quality of the advisor's information is low, there is overreliance on its recommendations and insufficient private information production. In contrast, if the advisor's information...

Uploaded: Jun 5, 2025

Ali Kakhbod, Uliana Loginova, Andrey Malenko, Nadya Malenko | Working Paper No. 00155-00

Advising the Management: A Theory of Shareholder Engagement

We study the effectiveness of shareholder engagement, that is, shareholders communicating their views to management. When shareholders and management have different beliefs, each shareholder engages more effectively when other shareholders engage as well. A limited shareholder base can thus prevent...

Uploaded: Jun 5, 2025

Doron Levit, Nadya Malenko, Ernst Maug | Working Paper No. 00154-00

The Voting Premium

This paper develops a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium, in a setting without takeovers and controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder tries to influence the composition of the shareholder base by accumulating...