We model platform competition with endogenous data generation, collection, and sharing, thereby providing a unifying framework to evaluate data-related regulation and antitrust policies. Data are jointly produced from users' economic activities and platforms' investments in data infrastructure. Data improves service...

We show that by lending to merchants and monitoring them, an e-commerce platform can price-discriminate between merchants with high and low financial constraints: the platform offers credit priced below market rates and designed to select  merchants with lower capital or...

Real-world contracts are typically private, observed only by their direct signatories, so agents working together are vulnerable to the principal opportunistically reducing other agents’ incentives. The principal can mitigate this commitment problem by giving the most skilled agent a budget...

Why does misinformation persist, and how does it distort the long-run beliefs and actions of rational agents? Suppose receivers see an infinite stream of messages from a sender of unknown type who observes private signals about an unknown state of...

We consider a dynamic adverse selection model where privately informed sellers of divisible assets can choose how much of their asset to sell at each point in time to competitive buyers. With commitment, delay and lower quantities are equivalent ways to...

On many important multi-dealer platforms, customers mostly request quotes from very few dealers. I build a model of multi-dealer platforms where dealers strategically choose to respond or ignore a request. If the customer contacts more dealers, every dealer responds with...