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Fintech Entry, Lending Market Competition, and Welfare

Uploaded: Aug 1, 2024

Xavier Vives, Zhiqiang Ye

We study fintech entry and how it affects competition, investment, and welfare in a spatial model. We find that fintechs with inferior monitoring efficiency can successfully enter because of their superior flexibility in pricing. It follows that fintech borrowers are...

Information Technology and Lender Competition

Uploaded: Aug 1, 2024

Xavier Vives, Zhiqiang Ye

We study how information technology (IT) affects lender competition, entrepreneurs’ investment, and welfare in a spatial model. The effects of an IT improvement depend on whether it weakens the influence of lender–borrower distance on monitoring costs. If it does, it...

Free entry in a Cournot market with overlapping ownership

Uploaded: Aug 1, 2024

Xavier Vives, Orestis Vravosinos

We examine the effects of overlapping ownership among existing firms deciding whether to enter a product market. We show that in most cases—and especially when overlapping ownership is already widespread, an increase in the extent of overlapping ownership will harm...

Hysteresis in price efficiency and the economics of slow moving capital

Uploaded: Jun 24, 2024

Francesco Sangiorgi

Will arbitrage capital flow into markets experiencing shocks, mitigating adverse effects on price efficiency? Not necessarily. In a dynamic model with privately informed capital-constrained arbitrageurs, price efficiency plays a dual role, determining both the profitability of new arbitrage and the...

Block Trade Contracting

Uploaded: Jun 12, 2024

Markus Baldauf, Christoph Frei, Joshua Mollner

We study the optimal execution problem in a principal-agent setting. A client contracts to purchase from a dealer. The dealer hedges, buying from the market, creating temporary and permanent price impact. The client chooses a contract, which specifies payment as...

Competition and Information Leakage

Uploaded: May 17, 2024

Markus Baldauf, Joshua Mollner

When seeking to trade in over-the-counter markets, institutional investors typically restrict both the number of potential counterparties they contact and the information they disclose (e.g., by requesting two-sided rather than one-sided quotes). We rationalize these important facts in a model...