We develop a model to illustrate that equity-based compensation for non-executive
employees and product market decisions are related. When the product market is com-
petitive and employees have low bargaining power, the unique equilibrium is for each
...

We study how commodity financialization affects information transmission and aggre-
gation in a commodity futures market. The trading of financial traders injects both
fundamental information and unrelated noise into the futures price. Thus, price in-
formativeness in...

We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with correlated assets owned by privately informed sellers. In the model, a trade of one asset can provide information about the value of other assets. Importantly, the information content of trading behavior...

We study a capital reallocation problem in which  investors can enter into a new market where they compete with each other in identifying the best deals. While ex ante investors are uncertain about their relative advantage in identifying the best deals, they...

This paper studies incentives in a dynamic contracting framework of a levered firm. In particular, the manager selects long-term and short-term efforts, while shareholders choose initially optimal leverage and ex-post optimal default policies. There are three results. First, shareholders trade...

We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework of housing and mortgage markets with aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, costly liquidity and strategic defaults, empirically relevant informational asymmetries, and endogenous mortgage design. We show that adverse selection plays an important role in...