We present a model of the market for advice in which advisers have conflicts of
interest and compete for heterogeneous customers through information provision. The
competitive equilibrium features information dispersion and partial disclosure. While
conflicted fees lead...

We study the implications of the interaction between rare disasters and financial development for sovereign debt markets. In our model, countries vary in their financial development, by which we mean the extent to which shocks can be hedged in inter-...

We study the disclosure policy of a regulator who oversees a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a strategic agent, who chooses how much to manipulate in response to the monitor’s reputation. Manipulation increases the arrival rate of a...

We develop a dynamic model of trading through market-makers that incorporates two canonical sources of illiquidity: trading (or search) frictions, which imply that market-makers have some amount of market power; and information frictions, which imply that market-makers face some degree...

We study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge-
intensive economy in which agents endogenously specialize in either production or consulting.
The resulting market for advice is plagued by informational problems, since both...

We study the effects of introducing competition for CEOs, assuming that the talent of
CEOs is not observable and that they can misreport their performance. Without competition
for talent, firms maximize their profits by offering inefficiently low-powered
...