Papers
Uploaded: Dec 30, 2016
A Dynamic Model of Optimal Creditor Dispersion
Firms often choose to raise capital from multiple creditors even though doing so may lead to inefficient liquidation caused by coordination failure. Potential coordination failure can, however, improve a firm’s incentive to repay its debt, thus increasing its debt capacity....
Uploaded: Dec 28, 2016
Credit Ratings: Strategic Issuer Disclosure and Optimal Screening
We study a model in which an issuer can manipulate information obtained by a credit rating agency (CRA) seeking to screen and rate its financial claim. Better CRA screening leads to a lower probability of obtaining a high rating but...
Uploaded: Dec 28, 2016
Alternating-offer Bargaining with the Global Games Information Structure
This paper studies frequent-offer limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria in the alternating-offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure: values depend on the unobserved quality of the object...
Uploaded: Dec 28, 2016
Contracting on Credit Ratings: Adding Value to Public Information
We provide a novel interpretation of the role of credit ratings when contracts between investors and portfolio managers are incomplete. In our model, a credit rating on a bond provides a verifiable signal about an unverifiable state. We show that...
Uploaded: Dec 14, 2016
Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks
A theory framework to assess how global, too-big-to-fail banks can be successfully resolved by national regulators.
Uploaded: Dec 14, 2016
Selling to Advised Buyers
In many cases, buyers are not fully informed about their valuations and rely on the advice of biased experts. For example, the board of the bidder relies on the advice of managers when bidding for a target in a takeover...
