Papers
Published: Journal of Monetary Economics, 2021
Regulation and Security Design in Concentrated Markets
The vast majority of regulatory debates about the benefits of centralized trading assume that the set of securities designed by financial intermediaries is immune to the market structure in which trade occurs. In this paper, we consider a regulator who...
Uploaded: Oct 7, 2025
Annuity Puzzle, Ambiguity Aversion, and Model Misspecification
We provide a positive analysis of annuity puzzles using well-known models of ambiguity aversion, specifically second-order expected utility (SOEU) and multiplier preferences (MP). We show that, within a standard framework, such as Savage's expected utility theory, the annuity puzzle can...
Uploaded: Oct 7, 2025
Endogenous Misinformation and Source Authentication
We study endogenous information provision and source authentication when secondary senders can copy primary senders' signals, providing a microfoundation for correlation neglect. Authentication mitigates this duplication bias but hinders information diffusion, creating ambiguous effects on misinformation and welfare. Crucially, we...
Uploaded: Oct 6, 2025
Information Acquisition in Fragmented Markets
This paper analyzes how market fragmentation affects traders’ information choices and market outcomes. We built a model of a decentralized market with costly information acquisition based on a double-auction model. We show that the information acquisition is lower than the...
Uploaded: Oct 6, 2025
Capital Structure and ESG Integration
We analyze how borrowers’ capital structure affects their incentives to integrate ESG. Borrowers may pursue socially valuable but financially underperforming projects to reduce expected payments to outside investors. These financial gains are amplified when the payoffs of investor-held securities are...
Uploaded: Oct 6, 2025
Dynamic Market Choice
In practice, many assets are traded in both transparent centralized markets and opaque decentralized markets. To explain traders' market choices, we develop a model of dynamic learning and market selection between the centralized and decentralized markets. With heterogeneous trader value...
