How do countries build a reputation for debt discipline? I develop a continuous-time model in which an impatient government, whose income follows a jump-diffusion process, finances consumption by issuing long-term debt to patient investors. The opportunistic government cannot commit to...

Exchanges increasingly generate revenues from selling transaction data, in addition to their traditional business of matching traders. Given exchanges' market power over their data, this raises questions about the quality and pricing of these data, and exchanges' contribution to market...

We study the liquidity choice of a bank subject to rollover risk and support from a lender of last resort (LLR) and study the consequences for bank stability, funding costs, and liquidity regulation. The liquidity choice balances forgoing profitable yet...

We document market power in U.S. equity securities lending and examine its origins and consequences. We develop a dynamic model of securities lending and estimate it on the cross-section of U.S. equities, showing that the dominant custodian-intermediated market structure emerges...

We study a financial advisory market in which low product relevance makes investor search unprofitable without intermediation. The advisor activates the market by recommending high-relevance products, financed by commissions from firms. Raising the regulatory penalty tightens the advisor's recommendation standard....

We develop a model of ESG investing where firms privately differ in their intrinsic ESG commitment: some value the non-pecuniary return from green investment, while others opportunistically greenwash. A pro-ESG lender can include a monitoring covenant that imperfectly detects greenwashing,...